

Unit 4

Utility

The concept of utility was initially thought of as a numeric measure of a person's happiness.

The theory of consumer behavior has been reformulated entirely in terms of consumer preferences, and utility is seen only as a way to describe preferences.

~~Cardinal~~ Ordinal analysis -

There are two analysis of utility -

There is a way of assigning a number to every possible consumption bundle such that more-preff bundle get assigned larger numbers than less-preff bundles.

$$(x_1, x_2) \succ (y_1, y_2) \text{ iff } u(x_1, x_2) > u(y_1, y_2)$$

Because of the emphasis on ordering the bundles, it is referred as ordinal utility analysis.

Monotonic transformation (MT)

A monotonic transformation is a way of transforming one set of numbers into another set of numbers in a way that preserves the order of the numbers.

MT is represented by $f(u)$.

Remember $u_1 > u_2 \Rightarrow f(u_1) > f(u_2)$.


Eg of monotonic transformations are x^n by a true no, adding any no, raising u to an odd power.

The rate of change of $f(u)$ as u changes can be measured as:

$$\frac{\Delta f}{\Delta u} = \frac{f(u_2) - f(u_1)}{u_2 - u_1}$$

* For a monotonic transformation, $f(u_2) - f(u_1)$ always has the same sign as $u_2 - u_1$.

The MT we are discussing is the M-T -
-ve MT are such that reverses the order of numbers



A represents a monotonic fn.

B doesn't represent MT

(Read 57 first para)

*

* Note: A monotonic transf. of a utility fn that represents the same pref. as the original utility fn.

Cardinal Utility


Theory of utility that assigns a magnitude rather than ordering is known as cardinal utility analysis.

Constructing a Utility function

We can't always find or derive a utility from the preference.

Some example includes preference curves like - intransitive preferences even that $A > B > C > A$. Then utility for these pref'ds to be $U(A) > U(B) > U(C) > U(A)$, which is impossible.

If preferences are monotonic, then the line through the origin must intersect every IC exactly once. Thus every bundle ^{higher} getting a label, and those bundles on IC's getting lower labels.



Concept of Marginal Utility

Rate of change in utility (Δu) associated with a small change in the amt of good 1 (Δx_1).

$$MU_1 = \frac{\Delta u}{\Delta x_1} = \frac{u(x_1 + \Delta x_1, x_2) - u(x_1, x_2)}{\Delta x_1}$$

→ change in utility

Thus $\Delta U = MU_1 \cdot \Delta x_1$

Also $\Delta U = MU_2 \cdot \Delta x_2$

It is imp to note that magnitude of MU depends on the magnitude of utility. Also remember MU itself has no behavioural content (read pg 66 last para before 4.5).

Marginal Utility and MRS

We know MRS is the slope of the IC which is the rate at which a consumer is willing to substitute a small amt of good 2 for good 1.

A utility fn. $U(x_1, x_2)$ can be used to measure the MRS.

Consider a change in the cons of each good $(\Delta x_1, \Delta x_2)$ that keeps utility const — i.e. a change in cons that moves us along the IC. then we must have

$$MU_1 \Delta x_1 + MU_2 \Delta x_2 = \Delta U = 0$$

Solving we get

$$MRS = \frac{\Delta x_2}{\Delta x_1} = -\frac{MU_1}{MU_2}$$

The -ve sign interprets that if you get more of (say) good 1, you're to get less of good 2 in order to keep the same level of utility.

The utility fn is not uniquely determined. Any monotone transformation of a utility fn leaves you with another equally valid utility fn.

The ratio of MUs is independent of the particular transformation of the utility fn.

$$MRS = - \frac{t \cdot MU_1}{t \cdot MU_2} = - \frac{MU_1}{MU_2}$$

Thus taking a MT is just relabelling the IC's.

Utility of Community - Just read.

Q Prove $x \succ y$ and $y \succ x$ and $x \sim y$ then $x \sim x$.

Q Prove if $\succsim$ is transitive, then show that $\succ$ is also transitive.

Q Is $\succ$ complete?

If $u(x)$ represents preferences $\succsim$ then $f(u(x))$ also represents $\succsim$ iff $x \succ y$ and $u(x) \succ u(y)$ then $f(u(x)) \succ f(u(y))$.

eg: $u(x) = x + y$ (1,1) (2,1)

$f(u(x)) = u^2$ or $2u$.


both gives higher values for (2,1) against (1,1).

Counter example

$$f(u, m) = -2u$$

$(1, 0), (0, 1) \rightarrow \text{welfare} = 1$

$$f \rightarrow (1, 0), (0, 1) = 1$$



$(2, 0), (0, 2) \text{ welfare} = 2$

$$f \rightarrow (2, 0), (0, 2) = 4$$

f is a diff fn.

eg: f is a fn of u and $f(u)$ is diff.

$$f'(u) > 0$$

As long as if you have +ve positive preferences in $f'(u)$ i.e. $f'(u) > 0$, then $u(m)$ represents the pref, then $f(u(m))$ also represents the same preference as $u(m)$.


Some examples of utility functions

① $\rightarrow (1) \quad u(x_1, x_2) = x_1 \cdot x_2$

or in general $x_1^\alpha \cdot x_2^{1-\alpha}$

Typical IC are S. $x_1 \cdot x_2 = k$ (level curves) -

$$\Rightarrow x_2 = \frac{k}{x_1}$$



Any monotonic transformation will give the same kind of image.

(P.M): This is a type of C.D.Fn).

The IC are ↓ sloping convex to origin monotonic curves.

$$MRS_{x_1, x_2} = \frac{MU_{x_1}}{x_2} = - \frac{x_2}{x_1}$$

$$du = \frac{\partial u(\cdot)}{\partial x_1} \cdot dx_1 + \frac{\partial u(\cdot)}{\partial x_2} \cdot dx_2$$

$$0 = du = \frac{\partial u(\cdot)}{\partial x_1} \cdot dx_1 + \frac{\partial u(\cdot)}{\partial x_2} \cdot dx_2$$

$$\Rightarrow \frac{dx_1}{dx_2} = - \frac{\frac{\partial u(\cdot)}{\partial x_1}}{\frac{\partial u(\cdot)}{\partial x_2}} = - \frac{\frac{\partial u}{\partial x_1}}{\frac{\partial u}{\partial x_2}} = \frac{MU_{x_1}}{MU_{x_2}}$$

$$\frac{MU_{x_1}}{MU_{x_2}} = MRS_{x_1, x_2}$$


$$U(x_1, x_2) = ax_1 + bx_2 \quad |s| = \frac{a}{b}$$

Note: when $a = b = 1$

$$U = x_1 + x_2$$

This case of U denotes perfect substitutes.

Other usual cases of substitutes are $2x_1 + x_2, 3x_1 + 2x_2$




$$MRS_{x_1, x_2} = -1$$

$$U(x_1, x_2) = \min \{ax_1, bx_2\}$$

Take the case of ^{right} shoes & left shoes, here it is a 1:1 ratio complements. Thus

$$U = \min(x_1, x_2) \text{ — perfect complements, which is a Leontief case.}$$




kink @ $x_1 = x_2$

Where MRS is not defined

horizontal part, $MRS = 0$

vertical part, $MRS = \infty$


(4) $U = \max(x_1, x_2)$



MRS isn't defined on the kink where $x_1 = x_2$

horizontal part, $MRS_{x_1, x_2} = 0$
vertical part, $MRS_{x_1, x_2} = \infty$

(5) $U(x_1, x_2) = x_1 \Rightarrow (x_2 \text{ is a neutral good})$



$MRS_{x_1, x_2} = 0$

(6) $U(x_1, x_2) = V(x_1) + x_2 = \bar{U}$


This case is called Quasilinear preferences.

In this case, both are "goods" $\Rightarrow$ V, sloping ICs

Here the ICs are vertical translates of one another

$x_2 = \bar{U} - V(x_1)$

$MRS_{x_1, x_2} = -V'(x_1)$



eg: $\ln x_1 + x_2$
 $\sqrt{x_1} + x_2$


These utility fun arent realistic but are easy to work with mathematically.

For concavity $V''(x_1) \leq 0$

(6) Cobb-Douglas preferences
the cone (i) is a special case of C-D utility fn

$$u(x_1, x_2) = kx_1^c \cdot x_2^d$$

The IC's are nice convex monotonic IC's which are well behaved



The 2

A very prominent MT of this fn are the
 (i) ln m-T
 (ii) saving to $1/c+d$ m-T

(i) $u(x_1, x_2) = kx_1^c \cdot x_2^d$
 $v(x_1, x_2) = \ln u(x_1, x_2) = c \ln x_1 + d \ln x_2$

(ii) $v(x_1, x_2) = u(x_1, x_2)^{1/c+d}$
 $= x_1^{c/(c+d)} \cdot x_2^{d/(c+d)}$
 let $a = \frac{c}{c+d} \Rightarrow$
 $v(x_1, x_2) = x_1^a \cdot x_2^{1-a}$